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ABSTRACT 
We explore the dynamical properties of the Godley-Lavoie model with a focus on Central Bank 
horizons. The stability properties of modes of regulation are traced from a regime of private bank 
money to the current crisis with the Central Bank levers of short-term bonds issue to the emerging 
policy regime of long-term bonds as built-in stabilizers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Capitalism is a mode of regulation. Its stability properties are not given and there is no 
stationary state to which it converges [1]. In response, institutions, especially codes of 
conduct pertaining to the common good, evolve and are embodied in empirical rules. 
Collective beliefs are represented in formal apparatus like the monetary and fiscal powers of 
the state. But generally, social norms are informal codes that evolve especially when 
individual actions cause negative side effects on others [2]. They serve the function of 
restraining egoistic impulses in favour of superior collective outcomes. Norms prescribe and 
proscribe behaviour. Below, we will be concerned with the mechanisms of accumulation that 
ensure coordination between the real and the financial sphere. Cooperation between the 
relevant stakeholders must be tacit in a social equilibrium and we contend that individual-
choice theories are a less than satisfactory level of explanation. Thus, we demur from 
regarding institutions as solutions of evolutionary games. Intertemporal equilibrium and 
stability are implied. Conventions, in this sense, may do no more than deliver a temporary 
equilibrium. They do not eliminate the ineluctable uncertainty under which agents must 
operate. Only, their representations of their dilemmas are transformed [3]. In evolutionary 
game theory, agents are backward-looking and naive. Their strategies, time after time, depend 
on past states of the world. On the other hand, cooperation can be supported over time by 
agents like the state that provide what the last authors referred to call “form-giving 
operations”. By delivering objects around which social relations can coalesce, only 
governments, say, can invest in form-giving policies across space and time. Indeed, the 
agenda of generalized Darwinism is being scrutinized critically [4, 5]. In political economy, 
variation is not blind nor selection passively endured, but actively pursued. In social 
evolution, the relative success of a “phenotype” does not depend on its capacity to reproduce 
but rather on the ability to assess and learn. The new principles of evolutionary biology of 
relevance for evolutionary economics are the systemic character of the genome which 
embraces cooperation, self-organization, and consciousness and the persuasive evidence that 
evolution is punctuated. For instance, the “new institutional” theories of finance are founded 
on the assumption that the macro implications of finance have to be derived from the study of 
the interaction between banks, financial markets, firms, and households [6]. One distinction 
that operates is that between liquidity and credit. The former pertains to the total volume of 
loanable funds available in the system, the latter to the total volume of loanable funds the 
banks are willing to provide. During a wave of pessimism, liquidity is rife but disbursement 
is low. In euphoric times, even if liquidity dries up, financial institutions will break the 
barriers of credit to borrowers. 
Our thesis, then, is that the interdisciplinary algebra of complex systems must be forward-
looking. The strategy must embrace novelty and surprise. Thus, while initial conditions 
matter in the particular solution of differential equations, they do not contain the path that 
societies may follow. In the case of the recent financial-real crisis, while many argue, after 
Hyman Minsky, that “it” happened in the past and will continue to happen again, the 
particular aspect of the present meltdown in the form of the construction of complex contracts 
requires special attention. Our interest lies in the revolutionary features of Federal Reserve 
policy to mitigate the recession. For the first time in the history of any central bank, the most 
important lender of last resort in the world has underwritten long-term real activity. Yet, 
formal models rationalizing this new stance are not to be found. We emphasize that our 
formulation below is a contribution to the heterodox literature on the subject. On the other 
side, the fungibility of the neoclassical model is being exploited and models are being written 
to include central bank balance sheets. “Forward-looking” must not be confused with R. Correa 
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expectation formation by rational agents. Our model is structural, free of microeconomic 
optimization exercises. Variety will be generated by the state equations. 
An early and unique treatment of the importance of stock-flow norms in the macroeconomic 
accounting process was the W. Godley and F. Cripps (1983) classic [7]. For instance, a 
variable like the fiscal stance played an important role in the steady state properties of the 
model. Recently, a completely self-contained and coherent stock-flow-consistent follow up is 
to be found in the W. Godley and M. Lavoie (2007) work of scholarship [8]. The role of 
norms is relatively muted here and with good reason. The notion of practices like the normal 
rate of capacity utilization in non neoclassical economics is slippery [9]. It is not generally 
the case that feedback mechanisms that pull the economy back to a normal state when it is 
out of kilter exist. Norms are only given at a particular point of time. Consequently, long-run 
analysis in the sense of fully-adjusted positions at normal rates is not likely to be meaningful. 
Attention should rest on short- or medium-run equilibria or provisional equilibria. They arise 
from the equality of savings and investment or between aggregate demand and supply. 
Furthermore, existing norms are different from targets. In truth, we can say no more than the 
rate of capacity utilization remains within an acceptable range in a given time frame. With 
radical uncertainty and the irreversibility of decisions about the capital stock, concepts like 
Harrodian instability might not be tractable. On the other hand, in the language of Régulation 
Theory drawing on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, habitus (our norms), while absorbed in 
extant practices, are also generative [10]. Change and even crises occur when habitus and the 
components of the economic fabric get desynchronized. The role of the state is immense here. 
The financial arms of the government, for example, can initiate a change in the rates of 
exchange of different forms of capital. The reactions of the old habitus no longer apply. New 
norms must apply to the newly constituted field. The mode of regulation coagulating since 
the early nineties has been christened “enlightened neoliberalism” [11]. The context is one in 
which the economic slowdown has been aggravated by the general hike in commodity prices. 
Industrial capital has dissolved its pact with labour and aligned itself with finance capital. 
Under the Fordist regime monetary policy was the handmaiden of fiscal policy [12]. Under 
financialization, the inflation rate is the sole variable of interest to the monetary authorities. 
The role of the state in the new dispensation is yet to be defined. In the sections that follow, 
the stock-flow norms that are both common across societies and that distinguish them are the 
degree of monopoly, unit costs, government expenditures and the direct tax rate. 
All regimes are common in being successively obsessed with and then downplaying inflation 
in analytical discussion. There are universal constraints on the depletion of natural resources 
and food but Keynesian scholars focus on costs which vary from one country and region to 
another. At the moment, deflation is the common enemy and pulling economies out of the 
trap of inactivity the universal agenda. Quantities are back on the drawing board, prices have 
been relegated to the sidelines. Thinking about contemporary recessions in the mainstream 
has moved beyond sticky-wage treatments of the labour market to generating outcomes 
without any opportunities for Pareto-improving worker-employer bargains [13]. The focus is 
on job creation rather than job loss. The incentive for job creation is the margin between the 
productivity of a new worker and the wage to be paid, both as discounted present values. As 
regards termination, workers do not lose their jobs because their wages are too high. They are 
fired or exit because the opportunity cost in the market at large exceeds their productivity in 
their current job. 
The Godley-Cripps and Godley-Lavoie architectures consist of sets of identities. We tease 
movement out of these relationships to provide a primary difference equation in the next 
section. The equation combines production and finance, micro and macro. The equation is 
stretched over the next two sections to correspond to changed monetary conditions. The first Regime-changes in a stock-flow-consistent model 
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two configurations are unstable. The introduction of the mechanism of the long-term bond 
provides a mild stability. 
PRIVATE BANK MONEY 
According to the circuitistes, firms draw on their credit lines with banks when they have to 
make payments. Financial intermediaries grant loans, L, and simultaneously create deposits, 
M. The deposits are transferred to the accounts of the employees. Output that has been 
produced but not yet sold constitutes an increase in inventories, ∆I. The increase in inventories 
is investment in working capital and the finance at this stage is initial finance. In sum, 
∆L = ∆M = ∆I. 
In an economy with only private banks, total gross production Y can be defined as the sum of 
payments to workers WB, the interest payments made by firms on their debts  , 1 1 − − t
L
t L r  and 
amortization funds [8]. The attraction of the framework emerges in the first few pages of the 
books in the inclusion of this fund in the accounts. Most texts ignore it because they are less 
than exacting in their accounting principles. Indeed, a complete model with amortization 
funds could generate inventory cycles with the importance of banks in the damping of those 
oscillations. Since our interest lies elsewhere, we exclude this component to define 
1 1 − − + = t
L
t L r WB Y  
More familiarly, total income is the sum of wages and profits Π. That is, 
Y ≡ WB + Π. 
Now, the historic costs of current-period sales, HC, is defined as [7] 
HC = WB – ∆I. 
The profit mark-up, therefore, is 
) ( 1 1 − − + Π ≡ t
L
t L r HC λ . 
Finally, we introduce an identity in real terms [8]. Assume that firms produce ‘widgets’ 
which are identical physical objects. Then, in real terms, Y translates to production, y. In that 
case, unit costs UC = WB/y. 
Putting all the equations and definitions together, we derive a markup-on-loans difference 
equation with the non homogenous part being the wage bill. 
y UC L r r L t
L
t
L
t t ⋅ + − + = − − − 1 1 1 ) / 1 ( λ . 
As indicated earlier, our fundamental equation combines the microeconomics of price and 
wage setting with the institution of relationship banking. Only the pure French circuit delivers 
a stationary state of the above system. Indeed, the initial disbursement of loans is the 
stationary state when there is no degree of monopoly and unit costs considerations are absent. 
Interest rates on loans charged by banks are a pathological draught at the moment of the 
closure of the circuit and should be equal to zero. With positive values of the above variables 
there is no meaningful solution. 
Post Keynesians have been unappreciative of the possible historically contingency of banks 
in the sense we understand them [14]. In recent times, the demand for loans has risen to finance 
non-GDP growth. Bank finance has not gone hand-in-glove with real production. At the same 
time, the prospects for classical banking in the USA, in one prognosis, are rosy [15]. Since 
the nineties, the banking system has been steadily consolidating, capitalising on the removal 
of barriers to interstate banking. Canada and most European countries underwent their 
consolidation and merger phase in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The R. Correa 
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outcome is few large banks along with a spread of community banks and small banks 
catering to local needs. The demise of Bear Stearns and Lehman has pushed other investment 
banks to merge with commercial banks. Thereby, they come under the rubric of federal 
regulation. The emergence of these universal banks, the claim goes, will return the system to 
the pre-Glass-Steagall institutional milieu and closer to the European model. 
GOVERNMENT MONEY AND PORTFOLIO CHOICE 
To the extent that holders of government debt are not the same individuals as taxpayers 
whose payments will service it, or, to the extent that current holders do not internalise the 
cost even if the ultimate debt-service liability falls on them, government debt is an asset to 
the public [16]. Having more or less of it, consequently, affects the optimum holding of 
portfolios of other assets and liabilities not excluding the desired holding of physical capital 
stock. Indeed, the case for Central Bank (CB) liabilities is fundamental in the context of the 
current debate about the future of central banks. CB liabilities are the unit of account of an 
economy. Even in the instance when the commercial banks’ demand for reserves is nil, CBs 
can influence interest rates if they pays a charge on reserves with them [17]. 
We introduce government bills, B, which pay an interest rate r. We ignore profits from the 
central bank in the government budget constraint and, consequently, an additional equation in 
high-powered money. With G denoting government expenditure and T direct taxes [8], 
) ( ) 1 ( 1 1 T G B r B t t t − + + = − − , 
that is the government must issue fresh bonds to finance its deficit [8] and 
) ( 1 1 − − + = t t B r Y T θ , 
where Θ is the direct tax rate. Both income from work and returns from assets are taxed. 
With taxes endogenous the equations above combine to 
G y UC L r L B r r B t
L
t t t t t t + ⋅ + − + − + − + = − − − − − ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ ) 1 ( 1 1 1 1 1 λ θ λ λ θ θ , 
(see the appendix for details). Our fundamental equation is now extended to include the items 
of the government budget constraint. The system is unstable. Note, for later reference, that 
the law of one interest rate does not hold and the policy rate is different from the market rate. 
The solution given by the null issue of government bonds is unsatisfactory. It is important for 
the CB to fix the rate of interest on its liability as a policy variable. There is no equilibrium 
value for a fiat unit of account [17]. However, the counterpart condition is institutionally 
interesting. According to the arithmetic, the level of government expenditure must be of an 
order in excess of the markup and unit costs in combination to ensure increasing loan 
disbursement. Directly, the equation describes the prospects of the recession, USA, 2007- [18]. 
There has been a fall in net lending to the private sector. Receipts in the form of new loans 
have been volatile and falling through 2008. The expectation is that gross lending will 
continue to fall below repayments for some time. 
LONG-TERM BONDS AND CAPITAL GAINS 
More government debt to service presumably implies the responsibility to raise more 
revenue. At the same time, a large and liquid market for securities without default risk 
improves the efficiency of the market for private placements [16]. The market for corporate 
bonds in the USA operates in a manner different from thirty years ago when, due to 
legislative constraints, the Treasury was effectively unable to issue long-term bonds. Indeed, 
the time might be ripe for central banks to embrace a neo-Schumpeterian perspective and, 
instead on fixing short-term targets, address long-term issues in the accumulation of assets [19]. Regime-changes in a stock-flow-consistent model 
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In a related development, during the last decade, governments have begun to partially fund 
pension fund obligations, recognizing that implicit pension debt represents a possible inter 
temporal fiscal constraint [20]. Furthermore, governments are alive to the threat that financial 
markets may penalize them in sovereign debt markets if this pension debt is not well 
managed. Consequently, new government pension funds have adopted portfolio investment 
strategies not different from private sector asset management. The success of these 
arrangements in providing long-term welfare rests on financial maturity as well as the 
capacity to adapt and innovate. Ultimately, they are social institutions and must represent the 
interests of the stakeholders. It is possible to design well-governed pension and retirement 
income institutions, public, private, and multinational, capable of hitting the golden mean 
between functional efficiency and stakeholder representation. The package might be 
implemented with different institutional amendments. 
We introduce a third component of wealth, long-term government bonds, which provides an 
opportunity to introduce capital gains into the model. Now the accumulation of household 
wealth V can be defined as 
CG C YD V V t t t t + − = − − ) ( 1 , 
where YD is disposable income, C is consumption and CG is capital gains defined as follows 
where BL distinguish long-term bonds from the earlier. 
1 − ⋅ ∆ = t
BL
t BL p CG . 
The Haig-Simons definition of income as consumption plus the change in wealth has been 
introduced [8]. In a world with fewer options, the excess of income over consumption would 
increase bank deposits. That is,  
t t C YD M − = ∆  
Putting it all together we make a detour from our main equation to examine the following 
difference equation in asset prices 
M V BL p BL p t
BL
t t
BL
t ∆ − ∆ + ⋅ = ⋅ − − − 1 1 1 , 
(the systems treatment is available in the appendix). The dynamics of an economy driven by 
the search for capital gains is plagued by the problem of unit roots. The conditions for 
stability are delicate. Returning to the main course, we have a government budget constraint 
with the fiscal levers exogenous and the addition of an additional asset [8]. That is to say, 
) ( ] ) 1 ( [ 1 1 1 T G B r B BL p BL p t t t t
BL
t t
BL
t − + + − − ⋅ = ⋅ − − − . 
In a manner identical to the earlier, with a loop describing taxes, we have [8] 
) ( 1 1 1 − − − + + = t t t BL B r Y T θ . 
Similarly, the equations combine to deliver 
+ − + − − − = ⋅ − − − − ] ) 1 ( [ ) ( 1 1 1 1 t t t t t
BL
t t
BL
t B r r B BL p BL p θ θ
G y UC L r L t
L
t t + ⋅ + − + − + − − ] ) 1 [( ] ) 1 ( [ 1 1 λ θ λ λ θ , 
(for the last time, the appendix has the formal details). Our master equation is stretched to 
absorb the contemporary innovation of long-term bonds. Along with the weapon of a tax rate, 
an additional direct weapon is the price of long-term bonds. Recall, the reciprocal of the price 
is the interest rate. The system decomposes with the stationary solution for the level of long-
term bonds determining the quantum of short-term bonds and loans outstanding. The contrast 
with the earlier regime is that the quantity of short-term bonds now is positive. Only those 
instruments should be chosen that augment systemic stability and dampen economy-wide 
negative spillovers. An illustration is the use of the discount window recommended by 
Minsky. He supported discount window operations in institutions like life insurance R. Correa 
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companies as long as they were occupied in ‘to the asset’ financing [21]. We have already 
noted that the Fed, in a first, has been providing credit directly to financial firms during the 
current crisis rather than disbursing liquidity rapidly to the market through open-market 
purchases of Treasury securities [15]. As theorists in the Social Structure of Accumulation 
(SSA) tradition have reminded us, the context for investment in durable assets is designed by 
state action [22]. Businessmen could as well turn to financial assets instead of plant and 
machinery in the absence of appropriate policy. Perversely, the suggestion is that the CB 
lender of last resort operations should be as unpredictable as possible. So-called constructive 
ambiguity is the defining privilege of the sovereign [23]. The first challenge faced by Central 
Banks during the current financial meltdown was the changing maturity composition of 
banks’ net demand for funding liquidity. There was an increase in the net demand for term 
funding relative to overnight funding. To a large extent this portfolio switch was due to the 
massive reintermediation of conduits. Such behaviour reflects the counterparty risk inherent 
in a deleveraging of the conduits. We end by recalling the evolutionary tone struck at the 
beginning. So-called evolutionary policy-making is the attempt, through concerted action, to 
anticipate and manipulate selection outcomes. The growth of the wealth of nations might also 
create “spontaneous disorder”. There is need for procedural welfare interventions. Policy 
problems are never given but continuously created in a process that involves deliberate and 
selective communication with specified agendas. 
CONCLUSION 
Commercial banking is institutionally fragile. Consequently, financial intermediation has 
been supported through history by CBs. The latter, in turn, have used bank rate policy to great 
effect. However, the current financial crisis has highlighted the tenuousness of short-term 
measures. The outcome might be one in which central bankers will grasp the future with all 
the weapons at their command. The nascent regime of accumulation is one in which the bridges 
between a perilous present and an uncertain future will be constructed by the two macroeconomic 
organs of the state working in tandem. We have offered some macro analytics of the 
instrumentality of the long-term bond with price-setting CBs. However, the activity results in 
a non-null level of short-term debt. It has also transpired that the tax rate continues to be a 
sharp stabilizing scythe. The policies will have to be fine-tuned to deal with the particularities 
of regimes. The institutional specifics include the degree of monopoly and unit costs. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Wynne Godley passed away on May 13 this year. This paper is dedicated to his memory. 
The inputs of two anonymous referees to an earlier draft were most helpful. The usual 
disclaimers apply. 
APPENDIX 
GOVERNMENT MONEY AND PORTFOLIO CHOICE 
In dynamical system terms, the master equation of the section is 
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Since the trace of the coefficient matrix is positive and the determinant is positive, the 
equilibrium is an unstable node. Regime-changes in a stock-flow-consistent model 
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The stationary solution is given by B = 0 and 
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LONG-TERM BONDS AND CAPITAL GAINS 
The story of capital gains is 
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The eigenvalues are lined along the main diagonal. The spectral radius is unity. The origin is 
attractor only if that number is strictly less than one. 
The complete model is given by 
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The equilibrium is a saddle point. Only the eigenspace associated with long-term bonds might 
be stable. Indeed, let us take the situation  0 > −ϑ
BL
t p  to begin with. As the price of long-term 
bonds begins to fall (the rate of interest on long-term bonds increases) and direct tax rate begins 
to rise, a qualitative change occurs at  0 = −θ
BL
t p called a saddle-node or fold bifurcation. 
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PROMJENA REŽIMA U KONZISTENTNOM MODELU 
ZALIHA I TOKOVA 
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Mumbai, Indija 
SAŽETAK 
Istražena su dinamička svojstva modela Godley-Lavoie s težištem na središnjoj banci. Svojstva stabilnosti 
načina regulacije su praćena od režima privatnog novca banke do aktualne krize s stabilizatorima središnje 
banke u vidovima od kratkoročnih obveznica do izvirućeg režima dugoročnih obveznica. 
KLJUČNE RIJEČI 
financijska kriza, dugoročne obveznice 